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Introduction
For many years, prepayment and default options embedded in mortgage contracts were
shown to affect the value of mortgages and mortgage-backed securities substantially. The
default motive is generally based upon equity considerations. The prepayment risk is a
function of the interest rate as well as macroeconomic, demographic and geographical
variables. Of course, one cannot fully predict exact prepayment behavior, but a current
line of research proposes to separate total prepayment into two parts, the ﬁrst being
interest rate related, that is, an induced prepayment resulting from an individual optimal
reﬁnancing strategy, and a second component caused by pure individual autonomous
reasons. As the understanding of induced prepayment increases, the greater gains in the
understanding of mortgage pricing seem to lie in the study of the autonomous
prepayments.1
The current research can be summarized into two broad categories. First, are the
prepayment estimation models that rely almost exclusively on the term structure of
interest rates by focusing on the differential between market and contracted rates. As
Peters, Pinkus and Askin (1984) write, these models necessarily imply that only the
reﬁnancing part of prepayment matters. This means that the chosen methodology
overlooks prepayments motivated purely by individual reasons, such as house sales
caused by job transfers, the desire to upgrade the quality of housing, and other
macroeconomic, demographic and geographic variables.
The models in the second category analyze prepayment using conditional probabilities
which, as the name indicates, attempt to estimate the conditional prepayment rate as the
proportion of principals outstanding at the beginning of a particular year that prepay
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Abstract. Using individual data from Freddie Mac’s portfolio of conventional mortgages,
this paper estimates prepayment probabilities as a function of characteristics pertaining to
the borrower, the loan, regional, and economic variables. Distinction is made between
induced and autonomous prepayments. Based on the curvature of the underlying
termination pattern, nonparametric methods are derived to estimate the prepayment
probabilities and to predict a mortgage life under various scenarios. The ﬁndings point to a
response asymmetry with respect to the level and trend of interest rates. Non-interest
effects reveal the signiﬁcance of the borrower’s characteristics, property age and regional
mobility rates on mortgage termination.during that year. Until recently, most of these models were estimated using a standard
linear regression, which could cause inference problems.1
The direction taken in this paper is to explore the nature of this relationship and ﬁnd
the sensitivity of the prepayment probabilities to the factors outlined above. We ﬁrst
review the literature on prepayment in part two of this study. In part three we discuss the
borrower’s strategy, and the determinants of the prepayment decision. In the fourth, we
describe the data set and its limitations. In part ﬁve, we use a basic life table method to
estimate the baseline prepayment risk and justify the use of a distribution-free approach
within the context of a maximum partial likelihood technique. The results are discussed
in part six. In the same section, we provide an example to show how the model can be
applied in practice. In the paper’s conclusion, we summarize the results.
The Prepayment Literature
Recent work on mortgage prepayment includes the work of Peters et al. (1984) who
examine the prepayment experience on a nationwide rich sample of conventional
mortgages. Approximately half a million mortgages are classiﬁed into 921 cohorts and
used in a least squares model. The conditional prepayment rate is regressed on several
variables: reﬁnancing costs, percent change in difference between the contract and market
rate, mean of household earnings in the cohort, a borrower’s age, the size of the property
per dependents, regional migration, and percentage growth in GNP. Though these
variables are all signiﬁcant, the authors ﬁnd that the reﬁnancing costs have the dominant
impact on prepayment.
The application of a proportional hazard model to mortgage termination is originally
due to Green and Shoven (1986). By accounting for possible censorship in the data
(mortgages that do not prepay during the sample period), their model constituted a
signiﬁcant improvement over traditional estimation techniques. The explanatory power
of their study rests on a single independent variable they describe as a ‘‘lockin,’’ deﬁned
as the difference between the face and market values of the mortgage divided by the
initial principal amount. In order to account for property appreciation over time, they
adjust the initial principal amount by the regional housing price index. Although they
obtain extremely signiﬁcant estimates for the ‘‘lockin’’ variable, their model was limited
to interest-related mortgage prepayment. As a result, terminations due to factors such as
regional mobility and family size or the need to upgrade the quality of housing could not
be accounted for in their study.
Quigley (1987) elaborates on the work of Green and Shoven by including household
mobility factors. He shows that mobility (and therefore prepayment) is positively
correlated with household size and education and negatively correlated with borrower’s
age, and the present value of his mortgage premium (or lockin). However, the sign of the
coefﬁcient of the borrower’s income is found unstable over time.2 Most importantly,
Quigley pointed to the signiﬁcance of the assumption underlying the proportional hazard
model.
Schwartz and Torous (1989) apply a log-logistic hazard on aggregated GNMA
mortgage pools and argue that the prepayment experience is consistent with the log-
logistic function. Their prepayment estimates are subsequently integrated in a valuation
model for mortgage-backed securities.
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Giliberto and Thibodeau (1989) make an important contribution by analyzing individual
data and including borrower-speciﬁc variables. The authors provide a theoretical
framework to analyze a borrower’s decision. They show that a borrower’s wealth depends
on the gain from exercising the prepayment option. In particular, they ﬁnd that the
interest-rate volatility slows down prepayment because a borrower’s wealth depends on
the value of continuing to hold the prepayment option. Their data, however, is limited to
borrowers who prepay but do not move.
Cunningham and Capone (1990) compare the termination experience of ARM vs.
FRM between 1982 and 1985, a period marked by volatile interest rates and house prices.
Their results support the option-based notions that the dominant factors are the current
equity net of moving costs for the default option, and the equity variables in case of
prepayment.
This paper is based on the spirit of the study by Peters et al. (1984)  and Giliberto and
Thibodeau (1989). It uses similar data but also accounts for the aging effect in a mortgage.
Its contribution to the literature can be summarized as follows:
· We allow for both the level and the trend of mortgage rates to inﬂuence a
borrower prepayment decision.
· In addition to the difference between a mortgage book and market values,
we explicitly account for mortgage reﬁnancing costs, and their impact in
reducing prepayment.
· We do not impose, a priori, a speciﬁc pattern for prepayment. Based on the
underlying hazard, we justify the use of a nonparametric approach that
allows many prepayment forms. We also test the model goodness of ﬁt and
the proportional hazard assumptions.
· We model autonomous prepayment using borrower characteristics from a
large sample of individual mortgages. Our prepayment data is regionally
diversiﬁed and not restricted to borrowers who have not moved.
The Determinants of Prepayment
The Borrower’s Strategy
In determining whether or not to move, homeowners assess the value of their existing
contract by comparing the difference between their contract rate and the prevailing
market rates. Borrowers also weigh in other personal factors, such as job relocations, size
of the household relative to their existing home, or divorces. But in addition to assessing
the magnitude of this difference, homeowners also look at the level of the contract rate
and compare that with what mortgage rates have been recently. This is important because
homeowners tend to delay their action to move if current market rates are relatively
higher than they have been in the recent past. We model the evolution of the interest rate
by constructing two variables that would motivate a borrower to prepay immediately or
delay action. Our basic assumption is that borrowers do not act the same way when
interest rates are rising as opposed to when they have been in decline. That is, borrowers
take positions on the future course of interest rates when making a prepayment decision.
Therefore, the previous trend of interest rates may inﬂuence prepayment.3
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interest-rate differential as such, but on the current monthly payment stream compared
with an alternative evaluated at the market rate. The larger the mortgage present value
differential, the more the incentive to prepay. For a given month, we choose the national
average of ﬁxed conventional mortgage rates as a proxy to the corresponding market
rate.
Any reﬁnancing decision must take into account the concomitant reﬁnancing costs.
These include discount points, closing costs, escrow, application and origination fees, title
searches, legal fees, and taxes. As the reﬁnancing costs rise, one would expect homeowners
to move less frequently. A rational homeowner would prepay only if the potential savings
from a new mortgage at a lower rate exceed the costs of reﬁnancing. Since no induced
prepayment will take place unless the present value differential is positive, homeowners
would delay prepayment when market rates are too high compared with their locked-in
contract rate. We model the interest-rate effect using the Lockin variable which has been
employed frequently in previous studies. The Lockin is deﬁned as the difference between
a mortgage book and market values, net of reﬁnancing costs.
Homeowner, Loan and Regional Characteristics
It is our belief that an important part of observed prepayments is not interest rate related
but depends primarily on individual factors that are difﬁcult to predict, much less
observe. We posit that homeowners’ moving habits depend on their income and family
size. For example, a high income could inﬂuence prepayment rates in two opposite
directions. On the one hand, a high income and wealth may reﬂect social and income
stability which suggests a lower probability of moving. On the other hand, an increase in
income encourages a homeowner to upgrade the quality of his/her housing, thereby
making a ‘‘move’’ more likely. Unfortunately, the data is limited to the borrower’s
information at the time of mortgage origination. Updates on a borrower’s future well-
being are unavailable. Data on income at the time of the mortgage origination is available
in our sample. To capture any family size effects on prepayment, we include a measure of
the borrower’s number of dependents.4 An increase in the number of dependents
increases the need to move to a larger property, and raises the prepayment risk.
We also test the signiﬁcance of the property age on prepayment. This variable may reﬂect
housing preferences of a certain risk category of borrowers. To account for changes in
borrowers’ mobility over time, we introduce a variable measuring annual mobility rates by
state at the time of prepayment. Implicitly, this variable captures the gain from moving as
borrowers change their residence seeking better jobs, housing location, etc.
Finally, to model any prepayment variation across regions, we include two dummy
variables that capture any residual prepayment effect unaccounted for in the preceding
variables. Examples include the effects of divorces which often lead to the sale of a
dwelling, or price appreciation which gives the borrower the possibility to cash equity out
of the property and reﬁnance the mortgage.
Construction of the Covariates
We divide the covariates chosen for this study into three main categories: ﬁnancial,
borrower-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables. A detail of their construction follows:
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where c and mt represent the contract and market rates of interest, PMT the borrower’s
monthly payments, RC the reﬁnancing costs, and t the remaining life of the mortgage.
The whole expression equals the difference between the present values of the mortgage at
the market and the contract rate minus the reﬁnancing costs.
UPTREND: A measure of the rise in mortgage rates. For a given month,
we take the difference between the current national average
mortgage rates and the last month that an upturn occurred
in that rate. We let UPTREND be equal to that difference if
the latter is positive, and 0 otherwise.
DOWNTREND: A measure of mortgage rates decline, deﬁned similarly to
UPTREND above. It is equal to the difference between the
current national mortgage rates and the last downturn if
that difference is negative, and 0 otherwise. In short,
downtrend (uptrend) is the absolute difference between the
peak (trough) and the current market interest rate.
LOANTOVAL: The ratio of the loan to the appraised value of the property
at the time of purchase.
Borrower-speciﬁc:
DEPEND: The square-root of the household’s number of dependents.
PROPTAGE: The age of the property in years at the time of purchase.
AGEBORRW: The age of the primary borrower in year.
INCOME: The logarithm of household total monthly income in
dollars.
Macroeconomic:
MOBILITY: The logarithm of the annual mobility rates by state at the
time of prepayment for mortgages which terminate during
the study. For all other mortgages the mobility rates are
calculated for the last year of the study.
CALIF, NORTCENT: Variable dummies that reﬂect the mortgage origination in
California or the Northcentral region. If a mortgage origin-
ated in neither regions, by default it is part of the
Northeastern region.
Data Description
Our data consists of a nationwide random sample of 6,248 mortgages from Freddie
Mac’s portfolio of conventional mortgages between 1973 and 1980. Data on borrower
mobility is obtained from the Census of Housing published by the Census Bureau. All
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California, Northcentral and the Northeast. The statistical inferences are conditional on
the path of interest rates between 1973 and 1980. During this period declines of interest
rates were few and short. This allowed few opportunities for borrowers to reﬁnance.
When confronted with sizable reﬁnancing costs, borrowers had to make sure that they
would stay in their current dwelling long enough to recoup the reﬁnancing costs. When a
relocation was anticipated, this left fewer opportunities for borrowers to take advantage
of lower interest rates.
Each mortgage has an age representing the time elapsed from its origination to the date
of our ﬁnal observation (1980). Let t denote calendar time from the date of issue (or
birth) of the mortgage to its termination. This termination can either fall within the time
interval of the study, or occur after 1980. Data on mortgages prepaid after 1980 are
termed ‘‘censored’’ in the sense that the observed termination date does not indicate
prepayment. Correspondingly, mortgages prepaid during our eight-year time interval will
be termed ‘‘failures’’. The estimation technique does not throw out the censored
mortgage observations. The factors that led borrowers to not prepay during the eight
years of the study are explicitly accounted for in the likelihood of prepayment.
Exhibit 1 lists the percentage breakdown of mortgage rates in the data set. It appears
that about 60% of the mortgages have rates between 9% and 10%. Origination years are
reported in Exhibit 1. About 56% of the mortgages in the data set originated between
1975 and 1978. Exhibit 1 also reports other sample statistics.
Estimation Methodology
The basic advantage of the Proportional Hazard Model (PHM) is its ability to separate
the prepayment risk into two major elements: an aging affect, and a mortgage-speciﬁc
component. It posits that at each point in time, there exists a baseline risk of termination
which depends on the age of the mortgage alone. The mortgage-speciﬁc risk component
will raise or reduce the baseline risk depending on the magnitude of the mortgage-speciﬁc
variables, such as the interest rate, regional mobility rate or the household characteristics.
The total risk (or hazard) of failure is a mixture of a baseline and mortgage-speciﬁc risks.
For a mortgage i, described by a vector of characteristics X, the total hazard at time t can
be written in the form:
h(t|Xi) 5 h0(t) exp {Xib} , (1)
where Xib5Xi1b11 . . . 1Xikbk, X is a row vector of k covariates, b is a column vector of
k covariate coefﬁcients, and h0(t) is deﬁned to be the baseline hazard, being the hazard
function of a mortgage for which exp (Xb)51. The baseline hazard is comparable to
FHA/PSA experiences which estimate the conditional prepayment probability as a
function of the mortgage age alone.
Our approach leaves the baseline hazard unspeciﬁed and estimates the parameter
vector b using a technique called partial likelihood. By using a nonparametric estimation
technique we make no distributional assumption on the baseline hazard which enables us
to derive more general results than other studies on mortgage termination.6
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Exhibit 1
State of State of 
Origination Frequency Percent Origination Frequency Percent
CA 4119 65.9 NH 2 .0
CT 15 .2 NJ 123 2.0
DC 75 1.2 NY 23 .4
DE 9 .1 OH 225 3.6
IA 31 .5 PA 50 .8
IL 149 2.4 PR 18 .3
IN 56 .9 RI 4 .1
MA 40 .6 SD 4 .1
MD 302 4.8 VA 513 8.2
ME 13 .2 VT 4 .1
MI 361 5.8 WI 66 1.1
MN 35 .6 WV 11 .2




























¢80 7 .1Estimation of the Baseline Hazard
As a ﬁrst step to our study of the prepayment experience in the data set, we estimate the
distribution of failure times in order to analyze the risk pattern of mortgage termination.
This gives us a preliminary result on the prepayment risk in the absence of individual
effects speciﬁc to the borrower, the loan, or the prevailing economic conditions. These
factors will be captured later in a vector of covariates.
In Exhibits 2, 3 and 4, we plot the estimates of the prepayment rate by mortgage rate
class. The graphs are equivalent to the hazard function that includes a single argument:
the age of the mortgage per month. The hazard rate is deﬁned as: Total mortgages
prepaying in month t/Total mortgages alive at the start of month t. The shape of the hazard
varies signiﬁcantly from one interest-rate class to the other. Looking at the hazard for the
mortgages with rates of 7.75%, we notice that the highest rate of 0.014 is attained at age
forty-eight months or four years.
Since the prepayment rate is quoted per month, a rate of 0.014 is equivalent to 16.8%
a year. The hazard at interest rate of 11% is substantially higher than the one at 7.75%.
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Mortgage Rate 7.75%The maximum prepayment risk is attained in three years and reaches 4.2% per month
(51% a year!). One would expect the prepayment risk to increase with the mortgage rate.
A simple comparison between mortgages in the last two classes shows that the risk can be
as much as three times higher.
The shape of the hazard function reveals important information about the pattern of
prepayment. Mortgages wih a rate of 9% have more than one minimum. The risk pattern
of mortgages falling in this category is problematic because it indicates that within this
class, mortgages are not homogeneous, but belong to more than one group. This
observation is also evident from the panels of Exhibit 5, which show the hazard by
geographical region. Multimodality in the hazard is noted for all three regions.
The presence of a multimodal hazard indicates that the population may not be uniform
in risk; that is to say, their prepayment patterns vary signiﬁcantly with some mortgages
achieving their highest prepayment risk at forty-ﬁve months and others around seventy-
eight. In a parametric hazard model, such heterogeneity would warrant a special
treatment when choosing a functional form for the baseline hazard. While one achieves a
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Mortgage Rate 9%better ﬁt by using a correct distribution, the prepayment pattern may not belong to a
particular class of distributions and therefore, it would be inappropriate to impose, a
priori, a prepayment structure on the model.7 This would produce inconsistent parameter
estimates if the wrong distribution is chosen. Based on these results, it appears that the
most likely hazard function for prepayment in our data set would be a multimodal
inverted U-shaped curve. While such patterns could be generated by a mixture of hazard
functions, it would impose an exogenous heterogeneity on the model rather than allowing
the data to determine its shape. Therefore, we deemed it more appropriate to leave the
baseline hazard unspeciﬁed, and chose to apply a distribution-free technique. Conse-
quently, the inferences we shall make would not depend upon a speciﬁc lifetime
distribution.
A Distribution-Free, Partial Likelihood Estimation
The basic advantage of the proportional hazard model as described by (1), is that the
baseline hazard needs not to be speciﬁed for the estimation of the regression coefﬁcients.
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Northeast
California
NorthcentralDetail of the estimation procedure and derivation of the likelihood function are found in
Kiefer (1985). The sample likelihood function over all mortgages i51, . . . , n can be
written as:
L(b)5Pi
n[exp(Xib) / Skeri exp(Xkb)] , (2)
where Ri is the set of mortgages at risk of prepayment at age ti. The maximization of the
likelihood is done by a Newton-Raphson Algorithm.
Empirical Results
The model parameter estimates are reported in Exhibit 6. At ﬁrst sight, it appears that
while the coefﬁcients of the components of optimal prepayment are statistically
signiﬁcant (high chi-squares), they have little economic signiﬁcance, and hence play a
small role in affecting the prepayment probability.
For example, the coefﬁcient of the covariate Lockin is negative, indicating that a higher
net present value differential reduces the mortgage age,8 and induces homeowners to
prepay. Although the value of this coefﬁcient is small, it expresses the impact of a one-
dollar change in the present value differential on the prepayment rate per month.
Naturally, such a minute change should have little bearing on the homeowner’s decision
to prepay. However, the effect of the Lockin variable is magniﬁed by the costs of
reﬁnancing a new loan that are accounted for in computing the present value differential.
Some of the previous studies did not account explicitly for the reﬁnancing costs and their
delay effect on prepayment.
The contribution of the interest-rate trend covariates to the prepayment hazard is both
strong and signiﬁcant. The estimated coefﬁcients measure the impact of a one percent
increase (or decline) in mortgage rates. The sign of the parameters suggests that
borrowers prepay when rates are falling and delay prepayment when rates are rising. This
conﬁrms our previous intuition that a period of falling mortgage rates is generally
coupled with high prepayment. In comparing the absolute values of the coefﬁcient of the
trend variables, we note an important asymmetry in borrower’s response. Overall,
homeowners are less responsive when rates are rising than when they are declining.
The impact of the borrower’s speciﬁc variables is also important. People with high
prepayment risk tend to be mature and own an older property. This is not surprising since
50% of the homeowners in the sample are between the ages of twenty and thirty. Why
should new properties possess a smaller prepayment risk may be difﬁcult to interpret. We
suspect that the sign of the estimated coefﬁcient reﬂects a borrower’s latent attributes.
The effect of the family size indicates that an increase in the number of dependents
reduces the mortgage age, and hence raises the prepayment risk, as borrowers try to
replace their existing property with a larger one. This supports the result of Quigley
(1989). The effect of a mortgage loan-to-value ratio is marginally signiﬁcant but with the
right sign. Our ﬁndings indicate that an increase in ﬁnancial leverage increases
prepayment as the beneﬁt of reﬁnancing is magniﬁed.9 Unfortunately, household income
is statistically insigniﬁcant. As expected, the coefﬁcient of the state mobility rates has the
right sign with a strong impact on mortgage termination.
Finally, with respect to the regional variables, both dummies are signiﬁcant. Their
effects indicate that, after accounting for all the variables in the model (including
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valuation of mortgage-backed securities the important implication is that regionally
diversiﬁed mortgage pools are likely to include less prepayment risk than nondiversiﬁed
ones.
Overall, the effects of non-interest prepayment are found strong and signiﬁcant. This
supports the argument that reliance on the interest-rate differential alone overlooks
important causes of prepayment. Our ﬁndings indicate that autonomous prepayment
plays a substantial part in the total prepayment function.
An Example
The primary purpose of the econometric model is to provide a forecasting tool to predict
conventional mortgage termination. This would enable lenders to achieve a better
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Exhibit 6
Nonparametric Proportional Hazard Procedure
Total Mortgages Prepaid Alive Percent Censored
6208 1078 5130 82.64
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA50
Criterion Without Covariates With Covariates Model Chi-Square
22 LOG L 17108.226 14196.723 2911.503 with 11 DF (p5.0001)
Dependent Variable: Mortgage Age
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr$
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square
Financial
LOCKIN 1 214.779777 .27649 2857 .0001
UPTREND 1 .505714 .06556 59.50308 .0001
DOWNTREND 1 21.258893 .11276 124.65339 .0001
LOANTOVAL 1 2.386177 .20727 3.47120 .0624
Borrower-speciﬁc
INCOME 1 .000005447 .0000337 .02610 .8717
DEPEND 1 2.124091 .04432 7.84009 .0051
AGEBORRW 1 2.392739 .12020 10.67656 .0011
PROPTAGE 1 2.009048 .00263 11.87090 .0006
Macroeconomic
MOBILITY 1 2.832889 .16000 27.09769 .0001
CALIF 1 .162970 .08692 3.51515 .0608
NORTCENT 1 2.302944 .11326 7.15462 .0075understanding of mortgage behavior and price more accurately the securities backed by
these assets. In the example below, we deal with the expression in (4).
Consider two new homeowners. A is a homeowner with a loan of $100,000 and a ﬁxed
mortgage rate equal to 11%. If the prevailing market rate is 9%, his Lockin variable10
would be 16.36%. For homeowner B, let the mortgage coupon equals the current market
rate (i.e., Lockin50). The predicted relative risk is computed by forming point estimates
of the hazard functions. The model predicts a risk ratio:
r(X1, X2) 5 (h1/h2)
5 exp{(X12X2)b}
5 e2.42
5 11.22 .                                                     (7)
Therefore, mortgage one is approximately eleven times riskier than mortgage two. That is,
the prepayment rate for mortgage one is eleven times larger than for mortgage two.
Conclusion
Using a nationwide random sample of 6,248 mortgages, this study distinguished between
a mortgage theoretical and effective lives and showed how prepayment varied with a set
of characteristics pertaining to the loan, the borrower, regional, and economic variables.
An important part of this study was to identify two different motives underlying a
borrower decision to terminate a mortgage prematurely. Precisely, a distinction was made
between ﬁnancial and autonomous prepayments, despite the fact that the borrower’s true
motives may be difﬁcult to discern, particularly when mortgage termination has multiple
causes.
Preliminary estimates of the baseline prepayment risk showed that mortgage
termination varied with the contract rate and region. More detailed analysis indicated
that the prepayment pattern was multimodal with more than one risk group of borrowers
within each region. Consequently, a nonparametric approach was adopted in order not
to impose a particular distribution pattern on the data.
Subsequent analysis of speciﬁc mortgage variables showed that borrowers speculate on
the future course of interest rates and exhibit an asymmetry in their response to the
evolution of interest rates. Precisely, borrowers were found more responsive when rates
are falling than when they are rising. The results of testing the effect of the loan-to-value
ratio indicate that prepayment risk increases with the degree of ﬁnancial leverage which
would augment the beneﬁt from reﬁnancing.
Regional and borrower variables suggest that prepayment is positively correlated with
the borrower’s age, propensity to have more dependents, the property age, and regional
mobility rates. Overall, these variables reﬂect the impact of social and demographic
effects that may explain why rational borrowers freely choose to prepay during adverse
economic conditions, when, for example, the prevailing market rate of interest exceeds
their mortgage rate.
Finally, the regional dummies showed that prepayment varied by region even after all
the preceding variables were accounted for. The implication for mortgage securitization is
that regionally diversiﬁed pools are less risky than nondiversiﬁed ones.
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1Hakim (1992a,b) provides a closer focus on autonomous prepayment.
2For the proportional hazard model, Quigley found that family income increased prepayment in
1979 and 1980 but reduced it in 1981. For the non-proportional hazard model, family income
reduced prepayment in 1979 and 1981 but increased it in 1981. However, only 1980 was statistically
signiﬁcant.
3Some of the Wall Street literature includes interest trend measures. For example, Chen and Ling
(1989) use the yield curve to proxy interest expectations.
4It is not the number of dependents that matters; rather, it is a measure of the borrower’s propensity
to have more dependents in the future. We capture this effect using a nonlinear (square-root)
transformation of the actual number of dependents. We wish to thank an anonymous referee for
bringing this point to our attention.
5The regional classiﬁcation is as follows: Northeast: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Washington, D.C., Virginia, West Virginia, Puerto Rico, Maine, New
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachussets, Rhode Island, Connecticut, the Virgin Islands. Northcentral:
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota.
California: California.
6Giliberto and Thibodeau (1989) and Schwartz and Torous (1989) assume a log-logistic hazard
distribution. Cunningham and Capone (1990), on the other hand, do not use a hazard model but
assume a logistic prepayment distribution.
7Insights to this problem are provided in Mofﬁtt (1985).
8A reduction in the mortgage age implies an increase in the prepayment hazard.
9The impact of the LTV ratio is capturing some of the effect of property appreciation on
prepayment. For example, an increase in the property value will, ceteris paribus, reduce the LTV
ratio and the beneﬁt of reﬁnancing the existing outstanding mortgage. However, an increase in
property appreciation also increases the likelihood that property owner borrowers will borrow
against their accumulated equity or trade it up for a better dwelling. We wish to thank one of the
reviewers for pointing out to us the signiﬁcance of property appreciation on prepayment.
10For simplicity, assume that the reﬁnancing costs are zero.
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